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 By applying two of the most accurate credit rating models, Altman’s Z score and 
Emery and Cogger’s Lambda, I have been able to set up a framework for comparing 
small Portuguese companies with larger FTSE corporations. These two credit rating 
models have been used in this paper as proxies for a firms stability and overall success. 
In addition to calculating individual firm credit ratings, I have also obtained cross 
sectional data on firm leasing intensities which I have used as the independent 
variables in a number of regression analyses. By regressing the credit rating outputs on 
the cross sectional leasing data, I have been able to establish whether leasing bears 









 Firm credit ratings are among the most reliable indicators of a companies’ financial 
stability and have a tangible impact upon the financial strategy a company chooses to 
employ. By indirectly affecting the cost of external financing through banks credit 
terms, a companies’ credit rating will dictate the order of ‘financing hierarchies’ 
(Frazzani, 1987, p. 1), which in turn influence the financing decisions companies make. 
In the last decade there has been extensive dialogue surrounding the risk management 
practices of banks and the incompetence that lead to the financial crisis. The resulting 
governmental regulation on banks has been overwhelming and has ultimately created 
a much more diligent financial climate. I will reserve passing judgement on whether or 
not this is beneficial for the economy at large, though unarguably regulation on banks 
has made accessing external finance in the Eurozone much more difficult than before 
2008. In the context of this forbidding financial climate, it is relevant to conduct 
enquiries into the mechanics of credit ratings, and to speculate upon how companies 
could form strategy to improve their credit position. In this thesis, I have isolated 
leasing intensity as an independent variable and conducted several lines of regression 
analysis to gain an impression of its impact on company credit ratings.  
 Leasing bears substantial consequences for company cash flow positions, depreciation 
expenses and asset flexibility among other things. For this reason, it is fair to ask 
whether the impact leasing has on firm performance can be mapped out in company 
credit ratings. Admittedly however, leasing represents but one of the many managerial 
tools that may adjust a firms credit position. For this and several other reasons, one 
might expect leasing to have a negligible impact on firm credit ratings. It is this 
predisposition that I will look to validate over the course of this paper through the use 
of regression analysis, proceeding with some direction from existing literature which I 
summarise in my literature review.  
 It should be noted however, that whilst there has been extensive academic literature 
produced on the topic of firm growth, and the spectrum of variables that influence it, I 
have yet to find analysis that specifically addresses the impact of leasing on firm 
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success. Despite this, the body of research surrounding firm’s decisions to use leasing, 
as well as related research on the impact of financing, in a broader sense, on firm 
success is very relevant to this topic and has influenced the direction of my research.  
 The central issue this paper looks to address is whether firms are sensitive to 
differences in leasing intensity over time. Whilst previous literature on firm cash flow 
sensitivity has indicated that larger firms are less vulnerable to variations in cash flow 
than small firms, they do not identify specific sources of financing which can be used to 
explain relative success among small and large firms. Nonetheless, the observation 
that larger firms are less sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow is significant and has 
formed the bulk of my hypothesis. Broadly, this proposes that differences in leasing 
intensity have little effect on the success of large firms, though it may be significant for 
small firms. 
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In the next section I review the 
existing literature which I have found relevant to this topic. I then go on to form my 
hypothesis on the back of this literature. Beyond forming my hypothesis, I describe the 
models I have used on the data sets, my methodology and provide some descriptive 
statistics on the data sets themselves. Finally, I have presented my results and offered 
some concluding remarks on the trends posited by the regression analysis.     
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2) Literature Review 
 
 In this section I intend to provide a broad synopsis of the articles I have found 
particularly relevant to this topic, and to indicate how they might direct the formation 
of my hypothesis. 
 I have already mentioned that I have yet to find literature pertaining to the 
relationship between leasing and credit ratings per se, though there is certainly a 
wealth of literature on related topics. Before entering into detailed discussion on the 
articles I have found more relevant to this discourse, I should like to briefly highlight 
the categories into which existing academic research falls under.  
 Firstly, the largest body of literature I have found discussing the practical implications 
of leasing is most adequately framed under ‘the relationship between leasing and 
debt’. Slotty (2009) for example provide a reasoned discussion as to why financially 
constrained firms use a higher intensity of leasing, suggesting it is to mitigate the 
agency costs incurred by other forms of financing. This is a theme that has certainly 
been carried through multiple academic papers on the topic. Sharpe and Nguyen 
(1995) again provide further evidence of higher leasing intensities among cash 
constrained firms, offering reinforced support for the view that these firms might 
reduce the cost of extending debt through leasing.  
 Perhaps the most interesting study within this field is Eisfelt and Rampini’s (2005) 
article “Leasing, Ability to repossess and Debt Capacity” where the authors point to a 
number of interesting external conditions effecting the ability to repossess, something 
which subsequently feeds into the risk the lessor is exposed to.  
 The second category under which there exists a huge body of research is ‘the 
relationship between debt and  bankruptcy’. Debt is invariably incorporated into any 
model attempting to predict the probability of default among firms. It is definitively 
the firms’ ability to cover its debt that renders it bankrupt or solvent. Thus the level of 
debt as a proportion of assets is always of interest when predicting probabilities of 
bankruptcy.  Halpern, Kieschnick, Rotenberg (2009) for example look at the defining 
characteristics of bankruptcy cases through observing Highly Leveraged Transactions 
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[HLTs] over time. They conclude that the debt composition is critical in determining 
whether an HLT goes bankrupt. Specifically, they find that HLT’s using public debt are 
more inclined to go bankrupt or face financial difficulties. 
  Wu, Gaunt and Grey (2010) also fit into this category, providing an interesting 
comparison of different prediction models. After assessing a list of models they 
confirm that “firms are more likely to experience bankruptcy if they have … high 
market-based leverage – total liabilities to the market value of total assets” (Y. Wu, 
2010, p. 45).  
 Finally, the category of research for which I have found very limited material falls 
under ‘the relationship between leasing and bankruptcy’. This represents a much more 
focused view on the cause of bankruptcy and has, to my knowledge, been scarcely 
written about. Perhaps the most common thread of research relating bankruptcy, or 
more generally the riskiness of firms, to their leasing activity is in previous attempts to 
derive leasing valuation models. Grenadier (1996) Derives one such model to 
determine the equilibrium credit spread on leases subject to default risk. The model is 
but one of several examples of lease contract valuation where a variety of leasing 
structures and lessee types can be incorporated. This is not the first attempt to provide 
valuation models for leasing and bears some relevant material pertaining to the 
inherent risk of leasing assets. However the paper falls short of providing any empirical 
support for its model and, more importantly, doesn’t go as far as to suggest the 
relationship between previous leasing usage and the valuation of future lease 
contracts.  
 This relationship between leasing and credit worthiness is essentially what I am 
looking to contribute to through studying the effects of variations in leasing intensity 
on firm credit ratings. The purpose of this paper is really to provide a focused enquiry 
into an area that several articles would at least suggest an answer to. Oliveira and 
Fortunato (2006) for example show that smaller and younger firms have higher growth 
cash flow sensitivities than larger and more mature firms (Oliveira, 2006). This is 
consistent with a wider body of literature supporting the view that financial 
constraints on firm growth may be relatively more severe for small and young firms. 
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 This observation follows on from Frazzani, Hubbard and Petersen’s 1988 article, 
“Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment” where the authors concentrate on 
establishing whether information asymmetries regarding cash flows create so called 
“financing hierarchies” (Frazzani, 1987, p. 1). This is a list of financing sources 
companies use with preference given to the cheapest ones. The authors maintain that 
in a perfect capital market with no information asymmetries, there is no cost 
differential between internal and external financing. However, when one introduces a 
world of imperfect knowledge, investors begin to require a higher premium, making 
external financing relatively more expensive, thereby creating a financing hierarchy. 
The central argument can be succinctly summarised as follows; 
“For young firms with short track records, the probability of purchasing shares 
of a lemon is undoubtedly high – as firms mature, information asymmetries 
diminish and the lemons discount rate falls” (Frazzani, 1987, p. 5) 
 Lemmon’s refer to firms who’s assets are overvalued, something the authors 
approximate using ‘Tobin’s q’.  
 The over-riding impression given by Oliveira and Fortunato and Frazzani, Hubbard and 
Petersen is that access to external financing is more constrained for smaller firms with 
a shorter track record of paying back loans. Frazzani, Hubbard and Petersen go on to 
show that investment is in fact “excessively sensitive” to cash flow fluctuations among 
small firms. That firm growth is strongly related to successful investment I will assume 
is axiomatically true. Subsequently, both articles seem to point to the conclusion that 
small and young firm’s growth is more sensitive to fluctuations in cash flow. That is to 
say, the rate at which a firm grows as a consequence of gaining access to financing, 
which in turn improves a firms’ short term cash flow position, is negatively correlated 
to the size and age of the firm. 
 Thorsten Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2008), in their paper “Finance, 
Firm Size and Growth” continue this line of research, showing further evidence of the 
sensitivity of smaller, younger firms to financing. Specifically, they analyse cross-
industry data where the inter-industry average firm sizes’ vary. The perspective of this 
paper is slightly more removed and leads to a more general conclusion about the 
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effect of the sophistication of economic and financial resources on industry. Again, the 
idea that the level of access to financing effects’ smaller firms’ more than large ones is 
consistent with the authors results. Chiefly, they find that “small-firm industries grow 
faster in economies with better developed financial intermediaries” (Thorsten Beck, 
2004)      
 These conclusions provide a relevant context in which to speculate upon the effect of 
leasing on firm growth and, more broadly, firm success. Leasing, by providing an 
alternative to issuing shares or other forms of debt such as loans, represents another 
conduit to securing investments. Its implications for corporate tax, depreciation and 
short term cash flow mean that many firms, especially cash constrained ones, resort to 
leasing to finance their assets. The determinants of corporate leasing policy have been 
the subject of a wealth of academic research and one could digress into a number of 
investigations with a view to explaining variations in leasing behaviour between firms. 
For the sake of formulating my hypothesis, it will suffice to say that smaller firms, 
whose access to other forms of financing is restricted, tend to rely on leasing more 
heavily than larger firms, who’s reputation in capital markets and among banks is more 
established. 
  




 In their survey of almost 3000 Small to Medium sized Enterprises [SME’s] throughout 
Europe, Oxford Economics’ report ‘The Use of Leasing Among European SME’s’ show 
that Leasing is unquestionably the most popular source of external financing among 
small firms in Europe. Their survey shows that around 40% of all SME’s in their data set 
use leasing to fund investments, the same proportion of those who use Retained 
Earnings and only slightly less than those who use Personal Funds.  
Figure 1 
 
(Oxford Economics, 2011, p. 6) 
 
 Whilst similar research has yet to be conducted for larger firms, it is reasonable to 
assume that they are less dependent on leasing to secure investment, especially if one 
considers the suggestions put forth by the literature presented in the previous section. 
Having said that, it is entirely possible that a similar, if not greater proportion of large 
firms in Europe will still use leasing to finance assets. The central question is whether 
the difference in the intensity of leasing has any bearing upon their financial success.  
 In light of the existing academic literature I have reviewed in the previous section, it is 
natural to arrive at the following logical structure; 
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1. Small firms are more sensitive than large firms to variations in cash flow. 
2. Accessing funds is generally harder for smaller, younger firms.  
3. Leasing represents a viable source of financing for smaller, younger firms.  
 Therefore; 
H1. Leasing is likely to have a greater effect on the growth and cash flow position of 
small firms compared to large firms.  
 This hypothesis relies on proposition three being valid. Subsequently, although it is 
not central to the research I conduct in this paper, I feel it is necessary to briefly clarify 
why leasing represents a more attractive form of financing than equity or debt.  
 One prominent feature of leasing that justifies this proposition is that leasing allows 
the lessor to retain ownership of the asset. The important implication of this is that the 
risk to the lessor is reduced as there is a claim on the asset should the lessee default 
on payments. Thus leasing allows SME’s to finance up to “100% of the purchase price 
of an asset, without having to offer any supplementary guarantees of collateral” 
(Oxford Economics, 2011, p. 8) 
 In addition to this, leasing grants companies more flexibility by allowing them to 
spread payments for a list of assets over a period of time, as well as allowing them to 
change the types of assets they use more easily. For young and small companies, such 
flexibility can be very useful, especially given uncertainties over future revenues and 
how their organisation will operate. It is important to point out that flexible asset 
management leads to greater control over working capital, something that again is 
incredibly important for smaller entities. Having a relatively large pool of liquid assets 
means that companies’ who incur unexpected payment obligations, or investment 
opportunities, are able to meet these requirements, or take advantage of the 
opportunities when they occur. 
 The importance of leasing in cash flow management has been shown to be a primary 
reason for its use among SME’s across Europe. Again Oxford Economics’ report proves 
insightful here by stating that “While no single reason stands out particularly, the 
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competitive price of leasing relative to other forms of financing was ranked most 
important by SME’s. The cash flow benefits of leasing are also consistently valued 
across industrial sectors.” (Oxford Economics, 2011, p. 8). 
 Further evidence from the survey shows that those SME’s that use leasing more 
intensely tend to benefit from higher growth. The reason for this is intuitive; leasing 
allows you to invest in assets whilst maintaining higher working capital and retained 
earnings for further investment.  
 Whilst the benefits of leasing do extend to larger, more established firms, I believe the 
extent of the benefit is much less noticeable. This is partly due to their capacity to 
borrow against a larger value of assets. Thus, if new opportunities for investment do 
arise, large firms will be able to release more debt to take advantage of this. 
Furthermore, the relative cost of other forms of financing will be much lower given the 
fact that larger firms benefit from a track record with which to estimate an interest 
rate suitable for the level of risk the firm represents.   
 Perhaps the most important observation to make with regard to larger firms is that 
their growth opportunities are arguably more limited, and cannot be realised simply by 
accessing debt. This is an extension of the point made in Frazzani, Hubbard and 
Petersen’s article. They mention that small firms are much more sensitive to changes 
in cash flow than large firms. I suspect that one reason for this is that the growth 
opportunities for smaller firms can be realised simply through accessing the cash 
necessary for capital investment, whereas driving significant growth with a company 
that has already established itself in the market requires much more than simply 
investing in new assets. Indeed, the list of companies that have been driven to failure 
through investing in inefficient assets is extensive. It stands to reason therefore, that 
growth for large firms is dependent on much more than just accessing cash, but a 
plethora of other managerial and external factors.  
 My second hypothesis therefore is; 
 H2: Whilst leasing does provide cash flow benefits to large corporations, its impact is 
much less noticeable and does not have a significant effect on a firm’s success.  
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4) Variable Descriptions 
 
 Firm success is a rather subjective term, something that can be measured against 
what one feels is important when analysing a firms overall financial position. Often, 
analysts will look at various multiples measuring asset efficiency, and more generally 
the capacity of a firm to generate cash. Whilst this is a well-established line of conduct, 
using a number of different multiples can make interpretation of results more 
complex. Often, insights will be gained through considering the multiples in unison, 
and drawing some sort of indication of where the results are pointing. However, due to 
the fact that company’s accounting data on Bloomberg can contain omissions, I have 
sought to use a model that encompasses a range of accounting data in one metric. For 
this, I have found models used in credit rating to be most appropriate.  
 Credit rating models typically try to establish a companies’ probability of default over 
a given time horizon. In reality, no one credit rating model is used to asses a firms 
likelihood of default as each one has a degree of inaccuracy inbuilt. In an effort to 
obtain an indication of the firms’ financial positions and their probability of default, I 
have chosen to use two base models; Altman’s z score and Emery and Cogger’s 
Lambda. I shall reserve discussion of these two models for the subsequent section and 
will instead highlight the outcomes the two models produce and how I intend to use 
their results.  
4.1) Altman’s Z  Score Model 
 
 As the name suggests, this model produces a firm specific z score which can be used 
to indicate the probability of default. I intend to apply two versions of the model to 
each of the firms in the data set, then to regress these results on the proportion of 
leasing used by each firm in T-2 (2010). Though the models produce a continuous set 
of outcomes, Altman suggests cut off points to interpret the scores, and subsequently 
offer credit terms to the company. Having a cut-off point will allow me to use a probit 
regression as well as a normal OLS regression to analyse the results as I will have two 
distinct predictions; “default” or “safe”.  
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4.2) Emery and Cogger’s Lambda 
 
 This model produces a liquidity index for the probability of technical insolvency. As 
with the Altman z model, I intend to use two versions with different values for the time 
variable, using both 4 and 6 year periods. I will discuss the implications of this in the 
next chapter. Unlike the Altman Z model, there is no cut-off point with which to 
interpret the results given by the index. Subsequently, I shall only employ a simple OLS 
regression to analyse the data, regressing the outcomes for this year (2012) on the 
proportion of leasing for the same data set in 2010. 
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5) The Credit Rating Models 
 
5.1) Altman’s Z Score 
 
 Altman’s z score, developed by Edward I. Altman in 1968, is a solvency measure used 
by lending institutions, institutional investors, and occasionally, by companies 
requiring credit to establish the likelihood of future bankruptcy. The original model 
uses five differently weighted financial ratios to determine a z score which indicates 
the likelihood of default. By employing a ‘Multivariate Discriminate Analysis’ [MDA], 
Altman was able to build upon a previous credit rating model developed by William H. 
Beaver in 1966, whereby a ‘univariate discriminate analysis’ was used to predict 
business distress with accounting ratio’s. 
 Using Multivariate Analysis, Altman was able to establish a stronger predictive model 
by incorporating several accounting ratio’s into the Z score function, thereby forming a 
more holistic approach to evaluating the financial position of a firm.  
 The objective of Altman’s Z score model is to classify firms into one of two a priori 
qualitative groups; bankrupt and non-bankrupt. The ratio’s in Alman’s Z make up the 
vector of variables that constitute a multivariate density function. “The discriminant 
function maps the multidimensional characteristics of the density function of the 
populations variables into a one-dimensional measure, by forming a linear 
combination” (Chung K. C., 2008). This takes the following form; 
Equation 1 
                           
Carrying out the MDA to arrive at the discriminant function required the following 
three steps;  
1) Establishing explicit groups  
2) Collecting relevant data for the objects in groups  
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3) Employing the MDA to establish the linear function which best discriminates 
between the two groups.    
 Altman’s initial step was to select a sample of sixty six corporations split evenly into 
the two groups, bankrupt and non-bankrupt. All of the firms in his sample qualified as 
Small to Medium Sized [SME] businesses, with a profile of assets ranging from $0,7 to 
$25,9 million. Firms that possessed a value of assets that were outside of this range 
were considered small or very large, and were removed from the data set. This was 
due to the impracticality of obtaining data for very small companies, (something that 
incidentally has influenced the direction of this paper), and the fact that the incidence 
of bankruptcy in large firms is very rare.  
 Selecting the right profile of multiples to be included in the function essentially 
involved considering their individual significance in discerning bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firms, as well as evaluating the inter-correlation between the variables. 
Ultimately, those variables that contributed to the highest predicting power of the firm 
when considered in unison were selected. Thus the contribution to the predictive 
power of the entire function was prioritised above the individual significance of the 
multiples.  
 The multiples that led to the best predictive power of the entire function were the 
following; 
X1: Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2: Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3: Earnings before interest and taxes [EBIT]/Total Assets 
X4: Market value of Equity/Book value of total debt 
X5: Sales/Total Assets 
Interpretation of Multiples 
X1: Working Capital/Total Assets 
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 The Working Capital/Total Assets ratio is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm 
relative to its size, here given by the total value of assets. Altman defines working 
capital as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. He maintains 
that ‘ordinarily, a firm experiencing consistent operating losses will have shrinking 
current assets in relation to total assets’ (Altman, 1968). Thus, one would expect this to 
discriminate between the two groups quite effectively.    
X2: Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
 This is a measure of cumulative profitability over time. Clearly, Retained earnings will 
amount over time, thus this measure implicitly accounts for the age of the firm. 
Consequently, the measure discriminates against younger firms whose reserves 
haven’t had the chance to grow. As Altman points out, this is indicative of what 
happens in reality. Often younger firms will pose a less favourable credit rating simply 
because they have fewer liquid assets. The risk of short term insolvency therefore is 
relatively higher.  
X3: EBIT/ Total Assets 
 This is a measure of the productivity if a firms assets, its ability to generate earnings 
from assets.  
X4: Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Debt 
 The market value of equity is measured by the combined value of shares outstanding, 
both preferred and common. This ratio is significant because it adds a market based 
ratio to the function, making it slightly more forward looking than models strictly 
based on accounting ratios.  
X5: Sales/Total Assets 
 Similar to X3, this ratio measures the ability of assets to generate sales. To that extent, 
it is also an efficiency measure of a firm’s assets. By itself, this multiple is the least 
significant in discriminating between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. However, its 
relationship with the other variables in the function led to an overall contribution 
which strengthened its predictive power.   
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Significance of Multiples 
 To test the individual discriminating ability of the variables, Altman carried out an “F 
test”. “This relates the difference between the average values of the ratios in each 
group to the variability (or spread) of values of the ratios within each group” (Altman, 
1968). In other words, the F test looks to measure the extent to which differences in 
the mean of each multiple for both bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms can be explained 
by variation in the multiples themselves. The results for each of the five multiples are 
presented in table 1.      
Table 1 
 Variable means and tests of significance  
        
Variable Bankrupt Group mean  Non Bankrupt group mean  F Ratio 
  n=33 n=33   
X1 -0.60% 41.40% 31.6 
X2 -62.60% 35.50% 58.86 
X3 -31.80% 15.30% 26.56 
X4 40.10% 247.70% 33.26 
X5 150% 190% 2.84 
  (Altman, 1968) 
 The level of significance is determined with cut-off points. An F ratio above 12 admits 
a significance level at 1% whilst an F ratio above 4 admits a significance level at 5%. 
Clearly, Multiples X1 to X4 are significant indictors of the differences in means 
between groups at the 1% level. X5 however, is not significant in explaining inter group 
mean variations and, as mentioned, is included solely due to its contribution to the 
function as a whole.  
 Calculating scaled vectors for each of the multiples gave an impression of the 
“contribution power” of each multiple, and leads to X3, X5 and X4 being classed as the 
biggest contributors respectively.  
 I have mentioned that the weights given to the individual multiples are dependent on 
the MDA assigning significance to each one. Altman’s original model considers publicly 
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held firms in the manufacturing sector and results in the weights being defined as 
follows; 
    
Equation 2 
                                 
 
5.1.1) Accuracy of Original Model  
 
 The accuracy of the function is derived simply by calculating the proportion of firms 
that were correctly classified either as bankrupt or non-bankrupt (Hits) over the total 
number of firms in the sample. A “type 1” error in the results occurs when the function 
incorrectly predicts a bankrupt firm as non-bankrupt. A type 2 error occurs when the 
function incorrectly predicts a non-bankrupt firm as bankrupt.  
 Altman carried out the accuracy test for one year and two years prior to bankruptcy, 
using the same firms for both years. Applying the model to firms one year prior to 
bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy yielded 63 correct hits, representing 95% accuracy. 
Under these conditions, type 1 error stood at 6% whilst type 2 errors stood at 3%.   
 Using data two years prior to firm’s bankruptcy the results became less accurate, with 




 Though the coefficients in the model were derived with a view to accurately 
predicting default among publicly traded firms in the manufacturing sector, Altman’s 
original model has been used to assess firms in a variety of business sectors. The 
appropriateness of this is a matter of some debate. For the purpose of the analysis 
carried out in this paper, I will use two variants of the model to gain a broader 
impression of the firms in my sample. After all, the purpose of my analysis is not to test 
the accuracy of the models employed, but to apply them with the assumption that the 
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models are accurate. Using various forms of the models allows me to gain a broad 
impression of a firm’s credit worthiness.  
 Interpreting the Z score requires a definition of bandwidths where one can determine 
the probability of bankruptcy with a minimum number of misclassifications. Altman 
concludes that, when applying the z score model with the coefficients defined in 
equation 1, all firms with a score less than 1.81 are bankrupt, whilst all those that yield 
a score higher than 2.99 fall into the non-bankrupt zone. The area between 1.81 and 
2.99 is classified as the grey area due to the susceptibility to miscalculations.  
 For practical reasons, Altman established a critical value within the grey area that best 
discriminates between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The value that discriminated 
between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms with the least number of misclassifications 
was 2.675.  
 
5.1.3) Variations of the Model 
 
 Although the original model is widely used for analysing different industry sectors, 
Altman’s z score has been modified over time to tailor it for different types of industry. 
These new models differ in the weights they attribute to the different multiples used in 
the function. Through applying the same MDA methodology, a linear combination that 
best discriminates between the two groups (bankrupt and non-bankrupt) is derived.  
 In some cases, extra ratio’s are included in the function to give weight to relevant 
industry-specific shortfalls in the model. This is a result of using scaled vectors to 
determine the individual contribution of different ratios to the discriminating power of 
the function as a whole. As the characteristics that define bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms will undoubtedly vary across industries, so the F statistics for the function’s 
multiples will vary. For this reason, the contribution of different ratios to the 
discriminating power of the function will also vary across industries, necessitating 
slight variations in the multiples used in the Z score function, and the weights 
attributed to them.     
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 As mentioned, I intend to apply two versions of the model, both developed by Altman 
himself. The first is the original model as described in equation 1. The second model is 
a revised version from Altman’s 1977 paper “Predicting the Financial Distress of 
Companies: revisiting the Z-score and Zeta models”. In this paper, Altman developed 
several variations of the original Z score model for application to different industry 
sectors and for different types of company (for example private and public companies). 
 For the sake of my analysis, I have decided to apply the version of the model 
developed for non-manufacturing firms, although previous literature suggests that the 
original model works just as well when applied outside of the manufacturing sector. 
This model is specified in equation 2.  
      
Equation 3 
                              
   The important difference with this version is that the fifth ratio, “Sales/Total Assets” 
has been eliminated. This minimizes “the potential industry effect which is more likely 
to take place when such an industry sensitive variable as asset turnover is included” 
(Alman, 1977). Interestingly, this model remains robust when there exists substantial 
variation in the types of asset financing employed by companies.  
 Numerous authors have taken the principle Multiple Discriminate Analysis technique 
and applied it to different industries using a variety of techniques to obtain a profile of 
coefficients. June Li, in her paper “Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy from 2008 
Through 2011” assesses the predictive power of several variants. Interestingly, she 
finds that including asset volatility into the model has little impact on the overall 
accuracy of the function. Perhaps her most relevant finding for the purpose of this 
analysis is that whilst the original Z score model was developed for manufacturing 
firms “it performs equally well in predicting bankruptcy for non-manufacturing 
companies.” (Li, 2012) 
 Whilst I am aware that several version of the model may be more appropriate for 
certain companies in different industry sectors, I believe using the two models 
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developed by Altman himself will be sufficient for this paper. Whether or not these 
models posit significant differences in accuracy will be something I discuss in more 
detail when analysing my results. However, the purpose of this paper is not to develop 
a model that accurately predicts corporate bankruptcy, but rather to assess the impact 
that leasing, as a proportion of a firms assets, has on a company’s credit rating over 
time, as measured by the Altman Z models. For this reason, I will only be using those 
models previously mentioned as proxies for firm financial health.  
 
5.1.4) Contemporary relevance of Altman’s Original Model    
 
 Changes in the banking regulatory environment, notably Basel II and more recent 
developments in commercial banking have led financial institutions to adopt a lower 
risk profile. This has subsequently drawn light on credit rating systems as more 
companies struggle to establish new lines of credit in an increasingly austere economic 
environment. Due to its simplicity, Altman’s Z score has been widely used in gaining a 
holistic view of a company’s solvency. As such, it serves as an important decision tool 
for lenders, which in turn makes it useful for managers and CEO’s in any leveraged 
company. Understanding how banks deduce credit ratings, and subsequently design 
the capital requirements incorporated into their loans is central to directing the 
management of a firm. Thus, the context of Altman’s Z score is broad ranging. It serves 
a prominent role in lending organisations, and subsequently serves as an important 
decision metric for firms themselves.  
 To contextualise the latter point slightly - If a firm is facing the prospect of developing 
a new product line or in deed retiring an existing one, reducing its labour force or 
outsourcing a part of its operations, it could conceivably simulate the impact this will 
have on its credit rating. A company’s operating decisions will all have a bearing on 
Altman’s Z score and with enough information, it is relatively straightforward to 
anticipate the extent of this impact. Thus, the use of Altman’s z score has a 
contemporary relevance as a managerial decision making tool, and is particularly 
appealing due to its simplicity.   
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5.2) Emery and Cogger´s Lambda 
 
 The second performance evaluation multiple I´ve chosen to use is Emery and Cogger´s 
Lambda. This is a liquidity index which is used as a proxy for predicting firm failure and 
has been derived from a probability distribution function describing the probability 
that the firm will become technically insolvent. Emery and Cogger define a firm as 
reaching technical insolvency when it is unable to meet short term cash requirements.    
 The Lambda index is argued to represent a marked improvement on Altman´s z score 
by offering a model that directly addresses issues pertaining to a firms cash flows. 
Though Altman´s Z score indirectly incorporates cash flows through looking at the net-
working-capital-to-asset ratio, it is an inadequate measure of liquidity.  
 The lambda index therefore provides a radically different approach to assessing the 
financial position of a firm by concentrating on its liquidity position, rather than 
weighting different measures of firm success in one function.  
 The authors describe their approach as using an “axiomatic description of a firm´s 
liquidity policy and liquidity position to obtain an expression for the likelihood that the 
firm will exhaust its liquid reserves (become technically insolvent)” (Cogger, 1982, p. 
290) That is to say, in forming their initial probability distribution function (pdf), Emery 
and Cogger use standard descriptors of, for example, the liquidity position, defined 
here as “a firms provisions for meeting its obligations” (Cogger, 1982, p. 291). From 
this they are able to form a broad pdf which describes the probability that a firm will 
reduce its liquid resources to the point of insolvency before, or at, time `T’.   
 
5.2.1) Derivation of the Liquidity Index 
 
 As mentioned, the liquidity index that Emery and Cogger use as a proxy for predicting 
firm failure is derived from a pdf. This is itself formed with three basic assumptions 
underlying a stochastic process. These are;  
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(1) That there is a time horizon (T) over which a firm´s liquidity position is a matter 
of concern.  The time horizon signifies the period over which it is costly to 
obtain extra liquid resources and may be unique to each firm. The liquid 
reserves held at the beginning of the period (Lo) therefore constitute the stock 
of resources that are available to meet cash requirements during the time 
period.  
(2) The firm’s periodic net cash flows are independent, identically distributed, 
random variables. This is required for a stochastic method.  
(3) During the time horizon, the liquid reserve balance is allowed to fluctuate 
randomly as long as it remains positive.  
With these assumptions, the authors form their probability distribution function as 
follows;  
Equation 4 
          
       
   
       
     
  
   
     
   
  
Where 
  = The normal distribution function 
     = Mean and Variance of net cash flow per unit of time 
   = Initial liquid reserve 
 = Length of the period in units of time.  
 
5.2.2) Interpretation of the pdf 
 
 The pdf as whole is quite intuitive. Concentrating on the first term, we can see that 
the probability of technical insolvency increases with the variability of cash flows over 
the period, but decreases if the initial liquid reserve and mean cash flow are relatively 
higher.  
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5.2.3) Using F(T) to Approximate Liquidity 
 
 There are two possible ways in which to use the pdf to approximate liquidity of a firm. 
One way is simply to apply it directly to a firm. The smaller the probability of technical 
insolvency as measured by the pdf, the more likely it is that the firm will be able to 
meet obligations and remain liquid throughout the period.  
 Alternatively, one can derive a statistic from the pdf which gives an indication of the 
relative liquidity across firms. The statistic is the negative of the first term in the pdf; 
Equation 5 
  
      
   
 
 Emery and Cogger argue that this is a reasonable method for measuring relative 
liquidity because, the first and second terms in the pdf measure “the probability that 
the liquid reserve is exhausted on day T and prior to day T, respectively” (Cogger, 1982, 
p. 293), and that these two probabilities tend to move together. As such, it should be 
possible to condense the two terms into the lambda statistic, and arrive at an index 
which exhibits most of the information contained in the pdf.  
 The authors provide an example, saying that a firm with high    and   and a low    
will likely have a high lambda index and a probability of insolvency on day ‘T’ close to 
zero. Conversely, a firm with low    and  , and high    will have a relatively high 
probability of insolvency on day T. Thus the expression in equation … contains most of 
the information about relative liquidity, despite it being insufficient for calculating the 
probability of technical insolvency.  
 
5.2.4) Empirical Evidence Supporting the Lambda Index for Predicting 
Failure 
 
 As I have mentioned, the Lambda index offers an improvement on Altman’s Z score by 
way of incorporating issues firms may incur with cash flows, namely cash flow 
variability and uncertainty. Furthermore, Emery and Coggers liquidity index 
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outperforms previous attempts at deriving a measure of liquidity which, by and large, 
have tended to adopt rather static approaches. The superiority of the lambda index 
over other liquidity models is due mainly to the fact that it is a dynamic measure of a 
firms’ liquidity position. By altering firm specific cash flow variability through different 
time periods, the lambda index is capable of providing a detailed profile of a firms’ 
liquidity position over time.  
 Through applying the Lambda liquidity index to a collection of fifty-two firms that filed 
for bankruptcy between 1949 and 1971, Emery and Cogger were also able to extend 
the application of the Lambda index as a failure predictor as well. In doing so, they 
expanded the definition of    to include all the resources that may be used to prevent 
ruin. This nicely foreshadows my application of the Lambda index, as I have chosen to 
include both ‘cash and marketable securities’, as well as ‘unused lines of credit’ within 
the initial liquid reserve variable of the equation. With    defined as a “total wealth 
position”, and with net cash flows measured as the periodic change in this variable, 
Emery and Cogger were able to apply the Lambda index to the data of fifty-two firms 
collected by Wilcox. Pairing similar firms in the data, Emery and Cogger calculated 
lambda index’s for all the companies, and predicted those with the lowest lambda 
scores would fail. Comparing their results to those obtained by Wilcox, Emery and 
Cogger found that the overall accuracy of their model was superior to Wilcox’s.  
 In a subsequent analysis, Emerry and Cogger also performed an unpaired classification 
test using lambda as a single discriminant variable. Again, this method yields more 
accurate results than those obtained using a multivariate analysis with the same 




 For the purpose of my analysis, I have taken the liberty of altering Emery and Cogger’s 
method slightly, something I will cover in more detail in my methodology. Given the 
current nature of my data, however, I will not be able to test the accuracy of the 
revised model, perhaps a significant limitation to the approach I have used. I will 
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however, assume that the accuracy of Emery and Cogger’s broader model as described 
in the previous section is indicative of the way I have applied it. 
  
5.2.6) Revised Model 
 
 To evaluate firms in my data set, I have had to take a retrospective approach to their 
accounting data, and develop a version of the lambda index which can be used to 
predict the probability that the firms will become technically insolvent. To do this, I 
have included several variables to arrive at a liquid reserve estimation. The function, as 
I have applied it, is described as follows; 
 
Equation 6 
   
                              
      
 
Where; 
        = Cash and Marketable Securities  
     = Unused lines of credit 
      = Cash flow from Operations 
      Cash flow from investing activities  
     = Standard Deviation of free cash flow – Operation Cash Flow being used for two 
scenarios;  T = 4 and T = 6 
 Most of the data necessary for calculating the revised lambda is available from the 
financial statements of the listed companies. The only variable that is harder to 
establish is the firm’s unused lines of credit. Given that this is a key source of liquidity 
for most companies, any liquidity measure that excludes this information would 
doubtless be inaccurate.  
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 Unfortunately, such information is rather difficult to obtain from the publicly available 
accounting information and I have therefore had to use a proxy to establish this. To do 
this, I looked at current liabilities as a proportion of total assets over a five year period 
prior to 2012. As a benchmark for the maximum level of credit lines, the maximum 
proportion of current liabilities over total assets for the five year period was chosen. 
The unused lines of credit were calculated as the residual between the maximum 
proportion of current liabilities over total assets, and the proportion of current 
liabilities that are presently being used.  
  By coincidence, the value of current liabilities over total assets was never larger than 
the five year historical maximum. However, in the instance where this had not been 
the case, I would have set the value for unused lines of credit at zero.  
 
5.2.7) Points of Difference 
 
 The major difference between Emery and Cogger’s model, and the one I have used, is 
the inclusion of Capital Expenditure. In Emery and Cogger’s original Lambda, Operating 
Cash Flow is used in the numerator. The model I am using however subtracts capital 
expenditure from this to get a more accurate figure for free cash flow to the firm. 
Capital expenditure is a significant part of any companies financial statements and can 
sometimes be a significant contributor to pushing a firm towards bankruptcy. Often, 
managers with incentives to acquire businesses will invest in poorly performing 
companies, or at least, assets that will reduce the overall asset efficiency. As such, 
including capital expenditure in the lambda equation provides a more accurate view of 
a company’s operations.  
 
5.2.8) Calculating Lambda: deciding the value of “T” 
 
 My objective in analyzing firms lambda values is to regress company’s proportion of 
leasing in 2010 (Y-2) and its probability of becoming technically insolvent in 2012 (Y), 
as measured by the revised lambda equation.  
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 The data necessary for calculating the Lambda and Leasing variables for listed 
companies is available from Bloomberg. As such, there is no information I use which is 
not readily available to the public in company annual reports. As mentioned, I have 
used a slightly revised version of the Lambda equation to derive a probability of 
technical insolvency.   
 An important decision in applying this equation is deciding what to use as the unit of 
time over which the periodic net cash flows are defined. I have chosen to apply two 
alternatives to gain some impression of the impact this has on my regression results. 
These are, T=4 and T=6, representing four and six year periods prior to 2012 
respectively.  
 Altering T in the lambda equation has two implications. Firstly, it changes the standard 
deviation of cash flows variable (     since it changes the time horizon over which 
cash flows are considered. Secondly of course, it changes the    variable. Both of 
these variables occur in the denominator of the equation. Thus reducing the time 
horizon over which periodic cash flows occur would necessarily reduce the 
denominator, and would result in a probability of technical insolvency being relatively 
low.  
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6) Methodology  
 
6.1) Public Companies 
 
 To summarise, my thesis aims to find support for the view that leasing, by way of 
granting increased access to financing, has more noticeable effects on smaller, younger 
firms, than it does larger, more established ones.  I have in the previous section 
provided some intuition as to why smaller firms may prefer leasing over other forms of 
debt, and indicated that credit rating models could be used as a metric for success.  
  The subsequent pages will be devoted to describing the process through which my 
research will be conducted. 
Regression Analysis 
 
 To establish the relation between leasing intensity and the model outputs, I intend to 
use regression analysis. Analysing the relationship between leasing and company 
credit ratings through regression analysis requires one to run several types of 
regressions to ensure that any correlation, or lack thereof, can be given a plausible 
explanation. In many cases, the true relationship between the variables is distorted by 
the fact that there exists a similarity between the two variables being compared. In 
other words, where an explaining variable is being regressed on a model output as an 
explained variable, and the model output incorporates similar variables to the 
explaining variable, some level of spurious correlation will arise.   
 Using the Altman Z score and Emery and Cogger’s Lambda in regression analysis poses 
a significant threat of producing spurious correlations given the wide range of 
accounting data used in each model. In fact, there are few widely used performance 
measures that aren’t already incorporated to some extent in each model. The 
following pages will detail the types of regressions I intend to run, and the ways I will 
try to control for spurious correlations.   
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6.1.2) Altman Z regressions 
 
Regressions by Sector 
 
1. Altman Z on Leasing Intensity 
 As previously mentioned, I will regress the intensity of both operational and capital 
leasing from 2010 on the original Altman Z outputs, as well as the revised 1977 model 
for 2012. In this case, I will use the model outputs as the explained (dependent) 
variables, and the intensity of leasing as the explaining (independent) variables.  
To get a sense of the industry effect, I will conduct analysis on my data set where the 
firms are separated by sector, as well as a pooled data analysis.  
2. Altman Z on Firm Size 
 Isolating firm size as an independent variable poses significant threat of producing 
spurious correlations given the fact that this is measured by asset value, a prominent 
variable in the Altman Z function. In order to control for spurious correlations 
occurring between firm size and the Altman Z outputs, I will rank the companies by 
size, then choose the top and bottom third, giving them a value of 1 and 0 respectively. 
These binomial values will be used as the independent variables and will ensure that I 
am discriminating between firms of significantly different asset sizes, without actually 
regressing the asset size on the Altman Z score.  
3. Reverse Correlations 
 In order to establish a line of causation, I will perform reverse regressions on each 
sector, making the explained variables the intensity of leasing for each security with 
the model outputs on the x axis. In the case where both directions of regression are 
significant, the more significant regression will indicate the lines of causation. In other 
words, this will tell me whether variations in leasing intensity cause differences in 
credit ratings, or if credit rating variations cause differences in company leasing 
intensity.   
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4. Dummy Variables 
 I intend to run dummy regressions where I check for significance of simply using 
leasing or not. The results from the regression will tell me whether or not leasing, by 
itself, is enough to impact upon company credit ratings.  
 
6.1.3) Pooled regressions 
 
 I will repeat each of the previous regressions on the pooled data set, ignoring the 
sectors that each firm is titled under. This will increase my sample size and give me an 
overall impression of the relationship between leasing and credit ratings.    
5. Probit regressions  
 Although Altman’s model produces a continuous set of Z scores, cut-off points, or 
bandwidths specific to each model make it possible to turn the continuous set of z 
scores into a dichotomous set of variables; “default” or “safe”. As previously 
mentioned, Altman suggested that a z score of 2.675 is the best discriminator between 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in the original model. For the revised 1977 model 
however, he does not carry out the same analysis and we are therefore left to decide 
upon an appropriate z score for discriminating between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms. 
 When testing the revised models accuracy, Altman defined a grey area of 1.22 and 
2.6. In other words, those firms whose z score’s were bellow 1.22 would almost 
certainly go bankrupt, whilst those who’s z scores were above 2.6 were almost 
guaranteed to remain solvent with a probability of 95%.  
 Although the original models “critical z score” is between the two boundaries of the 
grey area, I have chosen to use 2.6 as the discriminating z score. The consequence of 
this is that there is an increased likelihood of predicting default when interpreting the 
output of the model. Whether or not this is accurate for the individual firm is 
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debatable. However, it is certainly indicative of what happens in reality as those firms 
whose Z scores fall bellow 2.6 will face significantly higher interest charges than those 
firms whose Z scores are above 2.6. In other words, a score bellow 2.6 is interpreted by 
financial institutions to represent decidedly more risk than a score above 2.6. The 
corresponding credit terms will therefore be significantly different. 
6. Multiple Regression Analysis 
 Finally, to get a sense of how all relevant multiples effect the model outputs, I intend 
to run a multiple regression using; asset size, leasing intensity (as a proportion of 
assets) for both operational and capital leases and the nominal values of leasing for 
both operational and capital leases as the independent variables. Similar to the firm 
size regressions, I will control for spurious correlations by ordering the firms by asset 
set then assigning binomial values to the largest and smallest firms to regress on the 
model outputs.  
 
6.1.4) Testing for Linearity & Heteroskedasticity 
 
 The OLS regressions used assume a linear relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables. This poses a risk of rendering relationships between the two 
insignificant when there exists a non-linear relationship.  
 In order to establish whether there are other types of relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables, I shall plot the residuals of the regressions on 
the pooled data set. In those cases where the residuals indicate a non-linear 
relationship, I shall test for Heteroskedasticity using Stata. This will indicate whether 
the pattern shown by the residual between the predicted and actual model outputs 
with varying levels of leasing intensity bears any statistical significance. Where 
heteroskedasticity is present, the null hypothesis, which in this case states that there is 
no relation between leasing intensity and a firms credit worthiness, must be rejected.  
Thomas Bennett Ricardo F. Reis 36 
 
 
6.1.5) Lambda Regressions 
 
 The regression process for the lambda output is almost identical to that of the Altman 
Z regressions. After calculating the lambda’s for each firm in my data set, I will regress 
the model outcomes on the intensity of capital and operational leasing from 2010 in 
the same way as I will for the Altman Z results. As mentioned however, this model 
does not provide a cut off point with which to interpret the results. Subsequently I will 
not be able to do a Probit regression on the pooled data.     
 As with the Altman Z data, I shall also be testing for heteroskedasticity to ensure that 
the OLS regressions are not invalidating significant relationships.  
 
Summary of Regressions 
 
For the sake of clarity, I have produced a table summarizing the regressions I will carry 
out. As well as specifying what variables are included in each regression, I have 
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Table 2 
Altman Z Model Regressions 
No. Pooled/Sector Regression Model Independent Variable Dependent Variable Table 
1 By Sector OLS Altman Z Model Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 12 
2 By Sector OLS Altman Z Model Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 12 
3 By Sector OLS Altman Z Model Leasing being used as a Dummy variable Original Altman Z Model Output 13 
5 By Sector OLS Altman Z Model Original Altman Z Model Output Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets 14 
6 By Sector OLS Altman Z Model Original Altman Z Model Output Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets 14 
7 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 15 
8 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 15 
9 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Leasing being used as a Dummy variable Original Altman Z Model Output 28 
10 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Firm Size Original Altman Z Model Output 29 
11 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Original Altman Z Model Output Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets 30 
12 Pooled OLS Altman Z Model Original Altman Z Model Output Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets 30 
13 Pooled Probit Altman Z Model Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 32-35 
14 Pooled Probit Altman Z Model Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets Original Altman Z Model Output 32-35 
15 Pooled Multiple OLS Altman Z Model Asset size, Capital and Operational lease values as a proportion 
of assets, Nominal Values of Capital and Operational Leases 








Summary Of Regressions 
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Table 3 
Emerry and Cogger's Lambda Regressions 
No. Pooled/Sector Regression Model Independent Variable Dependent Variable Figure 
31 Sector OLS Lambda index  Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets Lambda index T=4 model output 36 
32 Sector OLS Lambda index  Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets Lambda index T=4 model output 36 
33 Sector OLS Lambda index  Leasing being used as a Dummy variable Lambda index T=4 model output 37 
35 Sector OLS Lambda index  Lambda index model output Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets 38 
36 Sector OLS Lambda index  Lambda index model output Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets 38 
37 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets Lambda index T=4 model output 39 
38 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets Lambda index T=4 model output 39 
39 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Leasing being used as a Dummy variable Lambda index T=4 model output 50 
40 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Firm Size Lambda index T=4 model output 49 
41 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Lambda index T=4 model output Operating Leases as a proportion of Assets 48 
42 Pooled OLS Lambda index  Lambda index T=4 model output Capital Leases as a proportion of Assets 48 
43 Pooled Multiple OLS Lambda index  Asset size, Capital and Operational lease values as a proportion 
of assets, Nominal Values of Capital and Operational Leases 
Lambda index T=4 model output 51 
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6.2) Private Companies 
 
 The methodology employed for private sector companies will be very similar to that 
used for large companies. The main difference between samples is that I will only be 
regressing the Altman Z score on leasing intensities for private companies as I have 
insufficient data for calculating the Lambda index. Additionally, I will only be carrying 
out pooled regressions on the private sector companies as there are not enough 
companies within each category (Micro, Small and Medium), to do categorised 
regressions.  
 The regressions I will carry out on the private sector companies are summarised in 
table 4 bellow.  
Table 4 
  Variables  
 Type Independent Dependent Table 
1 Normal Regressions Leasing / Assets Altman Z score  
2 Dummy regressions Leasing / Assets Altman Z score  
3 Reverse Regressions Altman Z score Leasing / Assets  
 
6.2.1) Altman Z Model for Private Companies 
 
 The model I have chosen to use for the private sector companies in Portugal is described in 
figure 2.  
 
Equation 7 
                                          
 Where; 
X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3 = EBIT / Total Assets 
X4 = Book value of Equity / Total liabilities 
X5 = Sales / Total Assets 
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The main difference between this model and the original and revised models I use for the 








7.1 Data from Bloomberg 
 
 The data for public companies has been obtained entirely from Bloomberg. Due to the 
fact that much of the literature I have used to form my hypothesis is based on analysis 
of European companies, I have chosen to use data for companies listed in the FTSE All 
World European Index.  
The average asset size of the firms across the six sectors I have analysed, before 
removing securities from the data set, is € 27.206.165.116,55. Table 4 provides 
descriptive statistics of the firms by sector. 
Table 5 
 Average AssetSsize Standard Deviation 
Consumer Discretionary  21.479.691.850,98 € 46.177.583.091,25 € 
Consumer Staples 20.240.666.471,69 € 21.328.061.166,88 € 
Energy 48.892.171.702,68 € 77.252.612.143,40 € 
Industrials 15.145.009.241,78 € 18.254.293.948,35 € 
Materials 17.090.544.854,73 € 22.707.672.731,47 € 
Utilities  40.388.906.577,43 € 56.515.631.168,53 € 
 
 The values for asset size have been taken from 2012 data and serve only to provide an 
impression of the size of firms being considered. When calculating the Altman Z and 
Lambda probabilities, the original currencies were used, whilst the values in table 4 
have been converted into Euro’s.   
 The number of observations I will use for each regression are presented in tables 5 
and 6. These figures vary according to which model output I am using in the regression 
as they required different types of information. In those cases where firms didn’t have 
enough data registered on Bloomberg to calculate either the lambda or Z score I 
discounted the firm from the data set.      
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Table 6 
Number of observations by sector for Altman Z 
Consumer Discretionary  46 




Utilities  37 
 
Table 7 
Number of observations by sector for Lambda 
Consumer Discretionary  75 




Utilities  29 
 
7.2) Data for small companies 
 
 Data for small companies was obtained from www.portaldaempresas.pt. All the 
companies that have been used in the sample have been classed into one of three 
groups; Micro, Small and Medium sized. These represent classes for the asset sizes of 
the companies, the descriptive statistics for which as presented in tables 7 to 9.  
Table 8 
Asset Size Statistics For Sample (€) 
Max 181.171.325,20 
Min 7.313,57 
St dev 32.551.831,15 
Mean 10.804.476,96 
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Table 9 – Sample Description According to Firm Size 
Size Desciption Frequency Mean Asset size 
Micro 32 9.774.630,742 
Small 20 11.384.825,49 
Medium 17 11.789.833,02 
Total 69  
 
 
Table 10 – Sample Description according to Leasing Usage 
Leasing Activity Frequency % of Sample 
Use Leasing 17 24,64% 
Don't Use Leasing 52 75,36% 
Total 69  
 
  




1. The most significant limitation in conducting this research has been in 
calculating the unused lines of credit for the lambda index. Although I have 
been able to arrive at a proxy for this variable, it undoubtedly contains a high 
degree of inaccuracy.  
 
2. Another prominent limitation is the number of observations used for some 
sectors. The lowest number of observations I have used is in running 
regressions for securities within the utilities sector. The deficiency of 
observations is due to the fact that, in many cases, there simply isn’t enough 
information on individual securities on Bloomberg. By conducting pooled 
regressions I will of course increase the number of observations and perhaps 
gain more accurate regression results, though this will get rid of any sector 
specific trends.  
 
3. Due to the cost involved in obtaining data from for private sector companies 
from www.portaldaempresas.com, I have only had access to data from 2011. 
Though accounting data for one year is sufficient to calculate the Altman Z 
scores, it is not enough to calculate the Emery and Cogger index due to its 
inclusion of cash flow volatility over a period of ‘T’ years, where T is greater 
than 1.    
 
4. Another consequence of the limited data for private sector companies has 
been that I am unable to perform regressions using the intensity of operational 
leasing as there are not enough firms in the data set that use it. Instead, I will 








8.1) Public Sector Results 
 
 My regressions have all been summarised into tables in the appendix. In each case, I 
have chosen to include the variables used, the R squared statistic, the Significance of F, 
the Coeffiecients and the P values. To preserve space, I have abbreviated the variables 
to the following form; ‘Independent Variable/Dependent Variable’.  If for example I 
conduct a regression where I am using Operational Leasing intensity as the 
independent variable and the Altman Z score as the dependent variable, I shall use the 
following form ‘Op/ALZ’.   
 Table 11 provides an index of the abbreviations I have used for each regression. 
Table 11 
Variable Abreviation  
Operating Leasing Intensity Op 
Capital Leasing Intensity Cap 
Asset size Size 
Original Altman Z output ALZ 
Revised Altman Z Output ALZ 77 
Lambda Output (T=4) T=4 
Lambda Output (T=6) T=6 
 
 The tables of results from my regressions can be found in tables 12 to 52 in the 
appendix.  
Heteroskedasticity Test 
 After plotting the residuals for the pooled data regressions, there seemed to be some 
evidence of heteroskedasticity as the errors clearly don’t follow a constant pattern. In 
other words, there was not a constant variation in the error terms for each 
observation. What is in fact observed is higher errors at lower levels of leasing 
intensity compared to higher levels of leasing intensity. These plots are presented in 
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figures 2 to 5 in the appendix for the Altman Z regressions, and 6 to 9 for the Lambda 
regressions. To establish whether this variance in errors is a significant consequence of 
differences in leasing intensity, I have conducted a Breush-pagan test and White’s 
test’s for Heteroskedasticity and homoskedasticity. The results from these tests are 
presented in tables 16 to 23 for the pooled Altman Z regressions and 40 to 47 for the 
pooled Lambda regressions.  
8.1.1) Altman Z Regressions 
 
Sectoral OLS Regressions (Tables 12 to 14) 
 This set of regressions includes the standard Altman Z output regressions on Leasing 
intensity, the dummy variables and the reverse regressions. The overriding impression 
from the summary statistics of the OLS regressions is that leasing intensity has little 
bearing on a firm’s credit worthiness over time. As a firm’s Altman’s Z score is 
influenced by a plethora of managerial decisions as well as external factors such as the 
economic environment in which the firm operates, it is easy to understand why leasing 
intensity has such little relevance for a firms credit rating, for larger firms at least. 
Nonetheless, if one accepts that leasing is but a small part of the managerial toolset 
deployed by managers to finance their assets, it is interesting to find that there are 
some instances where the correlation between leasing and a firm’s z score is almost 
significant. 
 An example of this can be seen when regressing Operational Leases from 2010 on the 
1977 Z scores in the Consumer Staples sector. The results from this regression posit an 
F statistic of only 6.5% and an R squared of 8,8% making it the most significant in the 
sectoral regressions. These results are shown in table 12 of the appendix. The fact that 
the most significant observation is found within the consumer staples industry may 
indicate some sort of industry specific structure that is more sensitive to differences in 
leasing intensities. Whether or not that is true however certainly cannot be 
ascertained from these results as it is still statistically insignificant.  
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Pooled Regressions (Tables 15 to 35) 
 If there was any indication of a relation between leasing and credit ratings at a sector 
level, the regressions conducted on the pooled data certainly doesn’t support this. The 
only conclusion that can be drawn from the results at a pooled level is that variations 
in leasing intensity bear absolutely no impact on the credit rating of large, listed firms. 
The same can be said for the multiple and probit regression results where again the R 
squared, and pseudo R squared statistics are incredibly small. 






Firm Size 29 
Reverse 30 
Multiple 31 
Probit 32 to 35 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test’s (Tables 16 to 23) 
 The Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity shows that when regressing the 
Altman Z model outputs on leasing intensity in the normal OLS regressions, there is 
significant Heteroskedasticity as the p values are substantially bellow 0,05. The results 
for these tests are presented in tables 16 to 23 of the appendix. 
 To control for the problem of Heteroskedasticity, I have run Generalized Least Squares 
regressions on the pooled Altman Z data. This test indicates whether the error terms in 
each observation are affected by the independent variables. The results for this test 
are presented in figures 24 to 27.  
The results from the Generalized Least Squares regressions indicate that, after 
controlling for heteroskedasticity, there is still no relation between the error terms of 
the regressions and the leasing intensities of firms. By comparison, the results from the 
Generalized Least Squared regressions are very similar to those of the Ordinary Least 
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Squared regressions. In fact, the only difference is that the confidence intervals have 
narrowed which, given that the r squared statistics are so small, is not relevant.  
 
8.1.2) Lambda Regressions 
 
Sectoral OLS Regressions (Tables 36 to 38) 
 The results from the OLS show a weak effect of the proportion of leasing on a 
company’s credit rating over time. In some cases, the significance of F exceeds 90%, 
rendering any sign of correlation completely unreliable. Despite this however, there 
are some points of interest that one should bear in mind when looking at the results 
from the OLS regression.  
 Firstly, within the sectoral regressions, the highest significance found is within the 
Materials sector where the probability of technical insolvency using T=6 is regressed 
on Capital leasing in 2010. This produces an R squared of approximately 17% with an F 
statistic of 0.04%. The results are presented in table 36 of the appendix.  
 Although there is little sign of correlation between leasing intensity in Y-2 and a firms 
solvency ratio in 2012, it is interesting to note that the most reliable results come from 
the Materials sector, and might admit something of the relative advantage of using a 
higher proportion of leasing in this sector compared to others. Again however, I would 
be hesitant in relying on this data to support this conclusion and would use it instead 
only as a guide towards further investigation.   
 
Pooled Data (Tables 39 to 51) 
 As with the Altman Z regressions, the pooled data proves even less significant than the 
sectoral data on all counts. The highest significance occurs when regressing the 
Lambda output with T=6 on capital leasing intensity where the R squared equals 0,7% 
and the F statistic equals 10%.  
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 The firm size, reverse, dummy and multiple regressions also lack any indication of 
significance and are generally less significant than the sectoral regressions. The tables 









Heteroskedasticity Test’s (Tables 40 to 47) 
The Breush Pagan tests for the lambda regressions indicate that heteroskedasticity 
isn’t present as the P value is greater than 5%. For this reason, I have not conducted 
Breush-Pagan and White’s tests on the lambda data. 
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8.2) Private Sector Results    
 
(Tables 52 to 54) 
 Contrary to what I have suggested in my hypothesis, the regressions performed on 
private sector companies indicate that there is little relation between leasing intensity 
and company credit ratings. In fact, the results from these regressions are for the most 
part much less significant than those of the public companies with F statistics ranging 
from 92% to 97% and the highest R squared statistic being 0.13%.   
 Although the results point towards there being very little relationship between leasing 
intensity and company credit ratings, I would be interested to find out if the results 
hold when the same analysis is applied to a larger sample size. Given the limited data I 
have had, I would be hesitant to conclude that the results from these regressions are 
in deed indicative of the impact leasing can have on SME’s in Portugal. What can be 
taken from the results however is that when considering the impact leasing has on 
company credit ratings, the distinction between large and small firms is not as clear as 
the literature reviewed in this paper would suggest.   
 
  




 The evidence from the regressions I have carried out indicate quite clearly that 
variations in leasing intensity have a negligible effect on companies’ credit ratings both 
for small and large companies. I have in my hypothesis suggested that the reason for 
this is that leasing is but one of the many managerial tools employed to improve credit 
ratings among management. One other plausible explanation is that larger 
corporations, relative to small companies, are less sensitive to changes in cash flow. 
This is certainly supported by much of the literature reviewed prior to this analysis. 
 However, whilst these explanations could conceivably be true for larger corporations, 
they don’t go very far in explaining the lack of significance found among small 
companies. Firstly, small companies generally have a more limited selection of 
financing tools call upon relative to large companies, and secondly, it has been shown 
that small companies are in-deed much more sensitive to variations in cash flow than 
large organizations. One would think therefore that those sources of financing that 
allow companies to invest in assets whilst keeping their cash flow positive would give 
the users of those financing sources a relative advantage. This is certainly not 
supported by the results in this study however.  
 What I am left to conclude therefore is that given the results obtained, there is little 
reason to believe that leasing can have any tangible impact upon a firms credit 
position. Unfortunately, speculating upon the explanations for the lack of significance 
found among smaller companies is outside of the scope of this paper and I can 
therefore only offer a suggestion as to how this line of research might be continued.  
 Given the data limitations I have highlighted, I would suggest conducting more 
detailed analysis into private company data to gain a clearer view of their leasing 
behavior. This would afford a more informed line of research on the effect leasing has 
on credit ratings, or any other success metric. That being said, it is still entirely possible 
that this research would pose similar results to those I have obtained here, thereby 
reinforcing my conclusion that variations in leasing intensity have a remarkably small 
impact on firm credit ratings.   
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Appendix 
PUBLIC COMPANY REGRESSION RESULTS 
Regressions: Independent Variable = Leasing Intensities  - Dependent Variable = Original  and Revised Altman z Probabilities  
Table 12 
     
Coefficients P value's    
Sector Resgression Variables R squared 
Significance of 
F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 Op/ALZ 0,017114307 0,427299963 2,890766 0,835916493 3,24925E-17 0,427299963 
Observations = 39 2 Cap/ALZ 0,000105959 0,950408432 2,976942 -0,653102444 8,86203E-19 0,950408432 
 
3 Op/ALZ 77 0,088813134 0,065376739 4,137561 -3,753328846 1,7368E-13 0,065376739 
 
4 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,070705107 0,10180804 3,977788 -33,25309937 5,20326E-14 0,10180804 
Energy 5 Op/ALZ 0,007977373 0,626881998 2,674207 1,68411004 3,87789E-12 0,626881998 
Observations = 32 6 Cap/ALZ 0,016194937 0,487634434 2,833509 -11,20058855 6,92788E-14 0,487634434 
 
7 Op/ALZ 77 0,002212856 0,798214676 3,769955 1,665256923 2,86047E-09 0,798214676 
 
8 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,006080879 0,671406811 3,940826 -12,88541787 1,16282E-10 0,671406811 
Utilities 9 Op/ALZ 0,014229596 0,515514605 1,675374 18,82030952 0,009964671 0,515514605 
Observations = 32 10 Cap/ALZ 0,007008055 0,648736131 2,089125 -21,44221661 0,000191635 0,648736131 
 
11 Op/ALZ 77 0,004169926 0,725494942 2,607533 18,1670246 0,023364493 0,725494942 
 
12 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,020130044 0,438578776 3,254508 -64,80111424 0,000781989 0,438578776 
Consumer 
Discretionary 13 Op/ALZ 0,014039297 0,432879288 2,378337 0,641841696 6,33857E-15 0,432879288 
Observations = 46 14 Cap/ALZ 0,003204381 0,708655051 2,426529 5,289228691 2,80164E-15 0,708655051 
 
15 Op/ALZ 77 0,035527491 0,209666845 6,833364 2,939251022 4,67874E-15 0,209666845 
 
16 Cap/ALZ 77 0,013294716 0,445433776 7,000853 31,01408393 2,18848E-15 0,445433776 
Industrials 17 Op/ALZ 0,035169243 0,162438671 14,67007 -35,01755931 0,000160579 0,162438671 
Observations = 57 18 Cap/ALZ 0,044487268 0,455582871 12,6455 -72,38932429 0,000262662 0,455582871 
 
19 Op/ALZ 77 0,027848269 0,214712724 22,73417 -44,17949529 4,80404E-05 0,214712724 
 
20 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,009778736 0,464265916 20,29823 -100,6769503 4,74675E-05 0,464265916 
Materials 21 Op/ALZ 0,013397358 0,471125071 3,077085 -3,667996198 7,40881E-27 0,471125071 
Observations = 41 22 Cap/ALZ 1,62798E-06 0,993683031 3,014684 -0,107050954 3,73443E-30 0,993683031 
 
23 Op/ALZ 77 0,016637582 0,42154588 8,841142 -10,78684139 2,93964E-28 0,42154588 
 
24 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,011660234 0,501575844 8,748834 -23,90835338 8,22523E-32 0,501575844 
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Regressions: Leasing Usage = Dummy Independent Variable 
Table 13 
     
Coefficients   P values   
Sector Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 Op/ALZ 4,48721E-05 0,967716426 3,014613821 -0,042870792 0,006200784 0,967716426 
Observations = 39 2 Cap/ALZ 0,078144332 0,084799022 3,454399635 -0,647611616 3,60534E-13 0,084799022 
 
3 Op/ALZ 77 0,003199881 0,732317526 3,072611975 0,746125682 0,158893902 0,732317526 
 
4 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,146484675 0,016182942 5,158443177 -1,827401414 6,59694E-10 0,016182942 
Energy 5 Op/ALZ 0,008437954 0,485561944 3,019766852 -0,330917243 5,93913E-08 0,485561944 
Observations = 32 6 Cap/ALZ 0,00328954 0,755196711 2,630289659 0,148439302 8,30729E-07 0,755196711 
 
7 Op/ALZ 77 0,036214156 0,296836054 4,597076476 -0,924665396 2,08706E-06 0,296836054 
 
8 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,005636833 0,682987475 3,549380257 0,364806874 0,000109113 0,682987475 
Utilities 9 Op/ALZ 0,009920146 0,587572121 1,365839935 0,6890442 0,37252162 0,61706476 
Observations = 32 10 Cap/ALZ 0,04786003 0,228996579 2,7689125 -1,113264543 0,001123267 0,228996579 
 
11 Op/ALZ 77 0,008437954 0,61706476 1,899203941 1,133171943 0,37252162 0,61706476 
 
12 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,06390981 0,162722362 4,539509319 -2,293954682 0,002248145 0,162722361 
Consumer Discretionary 1 Op/ALZ 0,014616013 0,298197168 3,067060421 -0,430414739 5,42749E-12 0,298197168 
Observations = 46 2 Cap/ALZ 0,067637406 0,023276046 3,179958548 -0,728497678 4,36493E-20 0,023276046 
 
3 Op/ALZ 77 0,032378183 0,119850263 10,1552076 -2,514462012 1,07003E-09 0,119850263 
 
4 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,048087905 0,057004688 9,625317157 -2,411008841 1,16687E-14 0,057004688 
Industrials 5 Op/ALZ 0,00227961 0,633695078 7,979033213 2,434915933 0,089283619 0,633695078 
Observations = 57 6 Cap/ALZ 0,006228767 0,430412529 8,140656725 3,072294454 0,008358872 0,430412529 
 
7 Op/ALZ 77 0,005108401 0,475313727 12,23601775 5,005718283 0,057867192 0,475313727 
 
8 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,006486768 0,420991483 13,79024505 4,3057237 0,001259596 0,420991483 
Materials 9 Op/ALZ 0,003678051 0,620583138 2,947228656 0,08305252 1,15601E-29 0,620583138 
Observations = 41 10 Cap/ALZ 0,003219273 0,643314463 3,059102639 -0,067051409 1,9724E-36 0,643314463 
 
11 Op/ALZ 77 0,005908618 0,530151531 8,367128554 0,299978926 1,34628E-29 0,530151531 
 
12 Cap/ ALZ 77 0,000344388 0,879700796 8,648812365 -0,06249664 3,48782E-36 0,879700796 
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Reverse Regressions   
Table 14 
     
Coefficients P values 
Sector Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 ALZ on Op 2,15211E-06 0,99255079 0,088561939 0,000154497 0,131642383 0,99255079 
 
2 ALZ on CAP 0,003641002 0,700703096 0,007709496 -0,000633351 0,185660471 0,700703096 
 
3 ALZ 77 on op 0,078522606 0,068754789 0,162551481 -0,018761225 0,000932769 0,068754789 
 
4 ALZ 77 on CAP 0,058982516 0,116594516 0,012042542 -0,001620585 0,012131872 0,116594516 
Energy 5 ALZ on Op 0,008465993 0,56721844 0,046370435 -0,003574006 0,028972187 0,56721844 
Observations = 32 6 ALZ on CAP 0,039447001 0,213183619 0,01061558 -0,001603581 0,015276998 0,213183619 
 
7 ALZ 77 on op 0,006102776 0,627330531 0,042005276 -0,001523386 0,010001479 0,627330531 
 
8 ALZ 77 on CAP 0,017057317 0,415699772 0,008003011 -0,000529382 0,01690391 0,415699772 
Utilities 9 ALZ on Op 0,021547329 0,385967794 0,01161033 0,00099326 0,000985948 0,385967794 
Observations = 32 10 ALZ on CAP 0,003427002 0,730724406 0,005294007 -0,000232899 0,00905673 0,730724406 
 
11 ALZ 77 on op 0,007384427 0,613064028 0,012572714 0,000326673 0,000196588 0,613064028 
 
12 ALZ 77 on CAP 0,014750622 0,473950796 0,005610692 -0,000271459 0,003174957 0,473950796 
Consumer Discretionary 13 ALZ/ Op 0,014039297 0,432879288 0,085648534 0,021873457 0,260959566 0,432879288 
 
14 ALZ/ Cap 0,003204381 0,708655051 2,426529189 5,289228691 2,80164E-15 0,708655051 
 
15 ALZ 77/op 0,035527491 0,209666845 0,052073912 0,01208726 0,494490219 0,209666845 
 
16 ALZ77/Cap 0,013294716 0,445433776 0,004727455 0,000428667 0,291980133 0,445433776 
Industrial 17 ALZ/ Op 0,035169243 0,162438671 0,095765826 -0,001004332 1,80635E-06 0,162438671 
 
18 ALZ/ Cap 0,010162633 0,455582871 0,014306125 -0,000140389 0,003719974 0,455582871 
 
19 ALZ 77/op 0,027848269 0,214712724 0,09597741 -0,000630344 3,42855E-06 0,214712724 
 
20 ALZ77/Cap 0,009778736 0,464265916 0,014507266 -9,71298E-05 0,004346984 0,464265916 
Materials 21 ALZ/ Op 0,013397358 0,471125071 0,028134877 -0,003652501 0,073728652 0,471125071 
 
22 ALZ/ Cap 1,62798E-06 0,993683031 0,003911414 -1,52075E-05 0,505623105 0,993683031 
 
23 ALZ 77/op 0,013397358 0,471125071 0,028134877 -0,003652501 0,073728652 0,471125071 
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Pooled Regressions 
Normal Linear Regressions 
Table 15 




 Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
1 Op/ALZ 0,001254977 0,600405083 4,203558792 -2,057679994 1,66787E-10 0,600405083 
2 Cap/ALZ 0,000904168 0,656623975 4,150334562 -14,42840673 4,39697E-11 0,656623975 
3 Op/ALZ77 0,0001818 0,842015162 7,744544726 -1,286373553 1,40188E-12 0,842015162 


























X Variable (Operating Leasing / Assets)  
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X Variable (Capital Leasing / Assets) 















Capital Leases / Assets 
Y = Revised Altman Z score 
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Testing For Heteroskedasticity  
Pooled Altman Z data analysis: Checking for the significance of Heteroskedasticity with single regressions 
1) Dependent: ALZ            
Indepdendent: Operating Leases / Assets                  
Breush-Pagan Test            
Table 16 
 
White’s Test            
Table 17 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0003
         chi2(1)      =    13.36
         Variables: fitted values of ALZ__12_
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total         3.93      4    0.4160
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.46      1    0.2262
            Skewness         1.99      1    0.1585
  Heteroskedasticity         0.47      2    0.7894
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.7894
         chi2(2)      =      0.47
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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2) Dependent: ALZ 





White’s TestTable 19 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0007
         chi2(1)      =    11.38
         Variables: fitted values of ALZ__12_
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total         3.96      4    0.4121
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.46      1    0.2262
            Skewness         1.97      1    0.1605
  Heteroskedasticity         0.52      2    0.7705
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.7705
         chi2(2)      =      0.52
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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3) Dependent: ALZ 77   








         Prob > chi2  =   0.0006
         chi2(1)      =    11.87
         Variables: fitted values of ALZ_1993__12_
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total         4.44      4    0.3497
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.76      1    0.1842
            Skewness         2.24      1    0.1347
  Heteroskedasticity         0.44      2    0.8030
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.8030
         chi2(2)      =      0.44
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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4) Dependent: ALZ 77 








         Prob > chi2  =   0.0012
         chi2(1)      =    10.52
         Variables: fitted values of ALZ_1993__12_
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total         4.52      4    0.3405
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.76      1    0.1842
            Skewness         2.23      1    0.1354
  Heteroskedasticity         0.52      2    0.7693
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.7693
         chi2(2)      =      0.52
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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General Least Squared Regressions 
Dependent: AlZ – Independent: Operating leases / Assets    Dependent: AlZ – Independent: Capital Leases / Assets 
Table 24           Table 25 





                                                                              
       _cons     4.203559   .6267369     6.71   0.000     2.975177    5.431941
op_Asset~10_     -2.05768   3.922521    -0.52   0.600     -9.74568     5.63032
                                                                              
    ALZ__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OIM
                                                                              
Log likelihood   = -777.4280348                    BIC             =  13521.19
                                                   AIC             =  7.053647
Link function    : g(u) = u                        [Identity]
Variance function: V(u) = 1                        [Gaussian]
Pearson          =  14703.39152                    (1/df) Pearson  =  67.13877
Deviance         =  14703.39152                    (1/df) Deviance =  67.13877
                                                   Scale parameter =  67.13877
Optimization     : ML                              Residual df     =       219
Generalized linear models                          No. of obs      =       221
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -777.42803  
. glm ALZ__12_ op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     4.203559   .6267369     6.71   0.000     2.968351    5.438767
op_Asset~10_     -2.05768   3.922521    -0.52   0.600    -9.788402    5.673042
                                                                              
    ALZ__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14721.8671   220  66.9175778           Root MSE      =  8.1938
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0033
    Residual    14703.3915   219  67.1387741           R-squared     =  0.0013
       Model    18.4755981     1  18.4755981           Prob > F      =  0.6004
                                                       F(  1,   219) =    0.28
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     221
. regress ALZ__12_ op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     4.150335   .5980961     6.94   0.000     2.978088    5.322581
Cap_Asse~10_    -14.42841   32.40973    -0.45   0.656    -77.95031     49.0935
                                                                              
    ALZ__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OIM
                                                                              
Log likelihood   = -777.4668411                    BIC             =  13526.36
                                                   AIC             =  7.053999
Link function    : g(u) = u                        [Identity]
Variance function: V(u) = 1                        [Gaussian]
Pearson          =  14708.55608                    (1/df) Pearson  =  67.16236
Deviance         =  14708.55608                    (1/df) Deviance =  67.16236
                                                   Scale parameter =  67.16236
Optimization     : ML                              Residual df     =       219
Generalized linear models                          No. of obs      =       221
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -777.46684  
. glm ALZ__12_ Cap_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     4.150335   .5980961     6.94   0.000     2.971574    5.329095
Cap_Asse~10_    -14.42841   32.40973    -0.45   0.657     -78.3033    49.44648
                                                                              
    ALZ__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    14721.8671   220  66.9175778           Root MSE      =  8.1953
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0037
    Residual    14708.5561   219  67.1623565           R-squared     =  0.0009
       Model     13.311036     1   13.311036           Prob > F      =  0.6566
                                                       F(  1,   219) =    0.20
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     221
. regress ALZ__12_ Cap_Assets__10_
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Dependent: ALZ 77 – Independent: Operating Leases / Assets   Dependent: ALZ 77 – Independent: Capital Leases / Assets 
Table 26           Table 27 
    
  
                                                                              
       _cons     7.744545   1.029979     7.52   0.000     5.725823    9.763266
op_Asset~10_    -1.286374   6.446267    -0.20   0.842    -13.92083    11.34808
                                                                              
ALZ_1993~12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OIM
                                                                              
Log likelihood   = -887.2134741                    BIC             =  38528.14
                                                   AIC             =  8.047181
Link function    : g(u) = u                        [Identity]
Variance function: V(u) = 1                        [Gaussian]
Pearson          =   39710.3385                    (1/df) Pearson  =  181.3257
Deviance         =   39710.3385                    (1/df) Deviance =  181.3257
                                                   Scale parameter =  181.3257
Optimization     : ML                              Residual df     =       219
Generalized linear models                          No. of obs      =       221
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -887.21347  
. glm ALZ_1993__12_ op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     7.744545   1.029979     7.52   0.000     5.714605    9.774484
op_Asset~10_    -1.286374   6.446267    -0.20   0.842    -13.99103    11.41829
                                                                              
ALZ_1993~12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    39717.5592   220   180.53436           Root MSE      =  13.466
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0044
    Residual    39710.3385   219  181.325747           R-squared     =  0.0002
       Model    7.22066243     1  7.22066243           Prob > F      =  0.8420
                                                       F(  1,   219) =    0.04
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     221
. regress ALZ_1993__12_ op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     7.769752   .9825935     7.91   0.000     5.843904      9.6956
Cap_Asse~10_    -17.19012   53.24494    -0.32   0.747    -121.5483    87.16804
                                                                              
ALZ_1993~12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OIM
                                                                              
Log likelihood   = -887.1809854                    BIC             =  38516.47
                                                   AIC             =  8.046887
Link function    : g(u) = u                        [Identity]
Variance function: V(u) = 1                        [Gaussian]
Pearson          =  39698.66476                    (1/df) Pearson  =  181.2724
Deviance         =  39698.66476                    (1/df) Deviance =  181.2724
                                                   Scale parameter =  181.2724
Optimization     : ML                              Residual df     =       219
Generalized linear models                          No. of obs      =       221
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -887.18099  
. glm ALZ_1993__12_ Cap_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     7.769752   .9825935     7.91   0.000     5.833202    9.706301
Cap_Asse~10_    -17.19012   53.24494    -0.32   0.747    -122.1282    87.74795
                                                                              
ALZ_1993~12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    39717.5592   220   180.53436           Root MSE      =  13.464
                                                       Adj R-squared = -0.0041
    Residual    39698.6648   219  181.272442           R-squared     =  0.0005
       Model    18.8943973     1  18.8943973           Prob > F      =  0.7471
                                                       F(  1,   219) =    0.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     221
. regress ALZ_1993__12_ Cap_Assets__10_




    
Coefficients   P value's    
Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
1 Op/ALZ 0,002029248 0,505273628 2,358196085 1,76890268 0,363580135 0,505273628 
2 Cap/ALZ 0,004495424 0,321098202 3,517927462 4,324456369 0,408608852 0,321098202 
3 Op/ALZ77 0,000841643 0,667977653 4,59290576 -0,648561143 0,001070774 0,667977653 
4 Cap/ALZ77 4,09313E-05 0,92465551 7,844424646 -0,234922493 0,000681547 0,92465551 
 
Pooled Firm Size 
Table 29 
    
Coefficients   P values   
Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
1 Size/ ALZ 0,0001629 0,877236187 3,94827081 0,165827689 5,78048E-07 0,877236187 




    
Coefficients   P values   
Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
1 ALZ/op 0,001255 0,600405083 0,07852525 -0,000609899 2,65204E-12 0,600405083 
2 ALZ/Cap 0,0009042 0,656623975 0,00741148 -6,26658E-05 2,55579E-08 0,656623975 
3 ALZ 77/Op 0,0001818 0,842015162 0,07713765 -0,000141328 2,20952E-11 0,842015162 
4 ALZ 77/Cap 0,0004757 0,747116965 0,00736948 -2,7674E-05 7,40489E-08 0,747116965 
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      R Square 0,002257305 
       Adjusted R Square -0,032628804 
       Observations 149 
       ANOVA 
     df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 5 14,19635956 2,839271911 0,064704969 0,99711404 
   Residual 143 6274,87946 43,88027594 
     Total 148 6289,075819       
   
           Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 4,149898603 0,862219372 4,81304264 3,73576E-06 2,445556324 5,854240882 2,445556324 5,854240882 
asset size 0,049919659 1,22214793 0,04084584 0,967475768 -2,36589058 2,465729898 -2,36589058 2,465729898 
op/assets -1,986278153 4,467342743 -0,444621841 0,657265264 -10,81683956 6,844283252 -10,81683956 6,844283252 
cap/assets -1,601501541 33,15875453 -0,048298 0,961546138 -67,14615188 63,9431488 -67,14615188 63,9431488 
op/assets x assets 2,58942E-11 1,3896E-10 0,186342657 0,852440145 -2,48787E-10 3,00575E-10 -2,48787E-10 3,00575E-10 
cap/assets x assets -1,00128E-10 6,39326E-10 -0,156614704 0,875769407 -1,36388E-09 1,16362E-09 -1,36388E-09 1,16362E-09 
Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0,111993135 
       R Square 0,012542462 
       Adjusted R Square -0,021984025 
       Observations 149 
       ANOVA 
     df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 5 235,7759459 47,15518918 0,36327073 0,872955099 
   Residual 143 18562,44253 129,8072904 
     Total 148 18798,21848     
   
           Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 8,869833567 1,48297095 5,981124289 1,69208E-08 5,938456507 11,80121063 5,938456507 11,80121063 
asset size -2,469270223 2,102028711 -1,174708133 0,242063922 -6,624333911 1,685793464 -6,624333911 1,685793464 
op/assets -3,814686582 7,683589262 -0,496471955 0,620323778 -19,00277729 11,37340412 -19,00277729 11,37340412 
cap/assets 2,993941364 57,0312745 0,052496484 0,958206361 -109,7393322 115,7272149 -109,7393322 115,7272149 
op/assets x assets 3,16172E-11 2,39004E-10 0,132287409 0,894942922 -4,40819E-10 5,04054E-10 -4,40819E-10 5,04054E-10 
cap/assets x assets -1,37671E-10 1,09961E-09 -0,125200465 0,900540688 -2,31125E-09 2,03591E-09 -2,31125E-09 2,03591E-09 
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Probit regressions 
1) Dependent: Original ALZ         
Independent: Operating Leases / Assets      
Table 32 
 
2) Dependent: Original ALZ        
Independent: Capital Leases / Assets      
Table 33 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1349078   .1022917    -1.32   0.187    -.3353958    .0655802
op_Asset~10_      2.59878   .9473339     2.74   0.006     .7420397     4.45552
                                                                              
 Probit__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -147.69727                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0351
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0010
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =      10.75
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        221
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -147.69727  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -147.69727  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -147.69729  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood =  -147.7368  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -153.07465  
. probit Probit__12_ op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     -.011764   .0931772    -0.13   0.900    -.1943879    .1708599
Cap_Asse~10_     7.536936   6.034586     1.25   0.212    -4.290635    19.36451
                                                                              
 Probit__12_        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -152.16584                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0059
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.1776
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       1.82
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        221
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -152.16584  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -152.16584  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -152.16786  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -153.07465  
. probit Probit__12_ Cap_Assets__10_
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3) Dependent: ALZ 77 
Independent: Operating Leases / Assets 
Table 34 
 
4) Dependent: ALZ 77 
Independent: Capital Leases / Assets 
Table 35 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     .7498086   .1077538     6.96   0.000     .5386151    .9610021
op_Asset~10_       .43909   .7333021     0.60   0.549    -.9981556    1.876336
                                                                              
Probit__12_0        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -115.46823                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0016
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.5391
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.38
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        221
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -115.46823  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -115.46823  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -115.46871  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -115.65686  
. probit Probit__12_0 op_Assets__10_
                                                                              
       _cons     .8161542   .1027964     7.94   0.000     .6146771    1.017631
Cap_Asse~10_    -4.479096   5.098382    -0.88   0.380    -14.47174    5.513549
                                                                              
Probit__12_0        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -115.29185                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0032
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.3929
                                                  LR chi2(1)      =       0.73
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =        221
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -115.29185  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -115.29185  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -115.29681  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -115.65686  
. probit Probit__12_0 Cap_Assets__10_
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Emery and Cogger’s Lambda Regressions 
Stage 1: Regressions: Leasing intensities regressed on Lambda scores for T=4 and T=6  
Table 36 
     
Coefficients P Values   
Sector Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 Op/T=4 0,0312576 0,281618014 0,029911 0,220522652 0,346673878 0,281618014 
Observations = 39 2 Cap/T=4 0,0077351 0,594443168 0,054429 -0,881574142 0,065927532 0,594443168 
 
3 Op/T=6 0,032112 0,275031774 0,039973 0,220473958 0,204366533 0,275031774 
 
4 Cap/T=6 0,0002109 0,930071232 0,059628 -0,14360068 0,042912993 0,930071232 
Energy 5 Op/T=4 0,0851662 0,124514884 0,146071 -1,040785922 0,002021478 0,124514884 
Observations = 32 6 Cap/T=4 0,0004752 0,910628472 0,104369 -0,419544198 0,013942841 0,910628472 
 
7 Op/T=6 0,1062273 0,084450184 0,161657 -1,138478897 0,000567195 0,084450184 
 
8 Cap/T=6 0,0002551 0,934459528 0,115166 -0,301071238 0,00630344 0,934459528 
Utilities 9 Op/T=4 0,0016105 0,836251161 0,049245 0,301387143 0,129683608 0,836251161 
Observations = 32 10 Cap/T=4 0,0285968 0,38051589 0,065831 -1,776484744 0,015414216 0,38051589 
 
11 Op/T=6 0,0012336 0,856466709 0,062101 0,300588332 0,095169206 0,856466709 
 
12 Cap/T=6 0,0370052 0,317436214 0,082194 -2,302961209 0,00835214 0,317436214 
Consumer Discretionary 1 T=4/Op 0,0013424 0,754986481 0,034478 0,011778474 0,000692211 0,754986481 
 
2 T=4/Cap 0,0011008 0,080446735 0,037167 -0,227794673 0,000116377 0,777495785 
 
3 T=6/Op 0,0010623 0,781318206 0,042491 -0,010030737 2,00369E-05 0,781318206 
 
4 T=6/Cap 0,0044923 0,567766347 0,043232 -0,440523759 4,48898E-06 0,567766347 
 
8 T=6/Cap 0,005626 0,421544533 0,162114 -2,417041819 2,67744E-20 0,421544533 
Industrials 9 T=4/Op 0,0507544 0,02572275 0,026736 0,145515387 0,001643907 0,02572275 
 
10 T=4/Cap 0,0731498 0,007071009 0,031326 0,499657916 3,32878E-05 0,007071009 
 
11 T=6/Op 0,0691313 0,008905679 0,039573 0,217032071 0,000263757 0,008905679 
 
12 T=6/Cap 0,0588093 0,01613192 0,04823 0,572536968 1,09338E-06 0,01613192 
Materials 13 T=4/Op 0,0027383 0,678885132 0,064772 -0,339681366 0,000437083 0,678885132 
 
14 T=4/Cap 0,2262674 6,21392E-05 0,031938 9,653994476 0,017585743 6,21392E-05 
 
15 T=6/Op 7,231E-05 0,94640145 0,07318 0,057552325 0,00015951 0,94640145 
 
16 T=6/Cap 0,1769681 0,000484475 0,048235 8,902030346 0,001088532 0,000484475 
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Stage 2 regressions: Leasing as dummy variables regressed on Lambda scores 
Table 37 
     
Coefficients P Values   
Sector Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 Op/T=4 1,92145E-16 1 5,827512929 0 1,09951E-07 #NUM! 
Observations = 39 2 Cap/T=4 -1,30554E-16 1 3,883620949 0 1,47246E-08 #NUM! 
 
3 Op/T=6 0,009626093 0,552368349 5,063213648 1,146448921 0,002503158 0,552368349 
 
4 Cap/T=6 0,004755257 0,676582701 4,209468187 -0,488770856 7,95369E-05 0,676582701 
Energy 5 Op/T=4 1,92145E-16 1 5,827512929 0 1,09951E-07 #NUM! 
Observations = 32 6 Cap/T=4 0,050180846 0,242729689 4,219741937 -1,292157719 9,32886E-05 0,242729689 
 
7 Op/T=6 0,009626093 0,552368349 5,063213648 1,146448921 0,002503158 0,552368349 
 
8 Cap/T=6 0,116976318 0,069367799 3,708197386 -1,622528882 2,46114E-05 0,069367799 
Utilities 9 Op/T=4 0,032740787 0,347557424 1,513735183 3,990010092 0,709944098 0,347557424 
Observations = 32 10 Cap/T=4 0,035686221 0,326382566 1,25775388 2,848592996 0,651036044 0,326382566 
 
11 Op/T=6 0,015745936 0,516601607 4,092575082 1,568757876 0,05397811 0,516601607 
 
12 Cap/T=6 0,005542387 0,7011201 3,449007705 0,636459523 0,0201073 0,7011201 
Consumer Discretionary 1 T=4/Op 0,000878404 0,800719579 0,031498431 0,005541386 0,117558604 0,800719579 
 
2 T=4/Cap 0,00030428 0,88191656 0,034433223 0,00257201 0,014877703 0,88191656 
 
3 T=6/Op 0,008610414 0,428466672 0,054857276 -0,016608417 0,00503194 0,428466672 
 
4 T=6/Cap 0,003520938 0,613072439 0,035767335 0,008375494 0,008355559 0,613072439 
Industrials 9 T=4/Op 0,000127277 0,912208083 0,034616636 0,002275915 0,072475694 0,912208083 
 
10 T=4/Cap 0,000841507 0,776757597 0,033938052 0,004224231 0,0046861 0,776757597 
 
11 T=6/Op 0,003062965 0,588325796 0,042005596 0,014268112 0,087387916 0,588325796 
 
12 T=6/Cap 0,001770769 0,68076958 0,04936104 0,007830948 0,001370827 0,68076958 
Materials 13 T=4/Op 0,01135887 0,398112353 0,038027901 0,027324644 0,190354026 0,398112353 
 
14 T=4/Cap 0,040518886 0,107858649 0,028922911 0,044726797 0,209582028 0,107858649 
 
15 T=6/Op 0,020244788 0,258207732 0,043578978 0,038035496 0,148837178 0,258207732 
 
16 T=6/Cap 0,02661049 0,194159627 0,047843013 0,037792968 0,050183475 0,194159627 
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Stage 4 regressions: Reverse regressions 
Table 38 
     
Coefficients   P Values   
Sector Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
Consumer Staples 1 T=4 on OP 0,031257613 0,281618014 0,07796514 0,141743322 0,001089978 0,281618014 
Observations = 39 2 T=4 on Cap 0,032112034 0,275031774 0,076310227 0,145650011 0,001624533 0,275031774 
 
3 T=4 on Cap 0,007735124 0,594443168 0,007010842 -0,008774218 0,015797221 0,594443168 
 
4 T=4 on Cap 0,000210944 0,930071232 0,006670404 -0,00146896 0,024190173 0,930071232 
Energy 5 T=4 on OP 0,085166197 0,124514884 0,050651864 -0,081828736 5,04715E-05 0,124514884 
Observations = 32 6 T=4 on Cap 0,000475241 0,910628472 0,005658004 -0,001132756 0,009897151 0,910628472 
 
7 T=6 on op 0,106227318 0,084450184 0,052891741 -0,093306357 3,89039E-05 0,084450184 
 
8 T=6 on cap  0,000255117 0,934459528 0,005638586 -0,000847363 0,01268155 0,934459528 
Utilities 9 T=4 on OP 0,001610531 0,836251161 0,015335929 0,005343728 6,17333E-05 0,836251161 
Observations = 32 10 T=4 on Cap 0,028596833 0,38051589 0,007554338 -0,016097427 0,002658526 0,38051589 
 
11 T=6 on op 0,001233556 0,856466709 0,015350121 0,004103806 7,49981E-05 0,856466709 
 
12 T=6 on cap  0,037005241 0,317436214 0,007759153 -0,016068547 0,002342715 0,317436214 
Consumer Discretionary 13 T=4 on OP 0,001342353 0,754986481 0,131836569 0,113966649 2,00501E-05 0,754986481 
 
14 T=4 on Cap 0,001100797 0,777495785 0,004950941 -0,004832409 0,000477009 0,777495785 
 
15 T=4 on Cap 0,001062342 0,781318206 0,140304183 -0,105908711 1,40424E-05 0,781318206 
 
16 T=4 on Cap 0,004492301 0,567766347 0,005195996 -0,010197637 0,000429442 0,567766347 
Industrials 21 T=4 on OP 0,050754416 0,02572275 0,054805043 0,348790719 2,07845E-05 0,02572275 
 
22 T=4 on Cap 0,073149848 0,007071009 0,005136205 0,146399858 0,227464805 0,007071009 
 
23 T=6 on op 0,069131299 0,008905679 0,050283797 0,318530337 0,000122584 0,008905679 
 
24 T=6 on cap  0,058809276 0,01613192 0,004918773 0,102716993 0,267974202 0,01613192 
Materials 25 T=4 on OP 0,002738288 0,678885132 0,01486346 -0,008061343 1,74646E-08 0,678885132 
 
26 T=4 on Cap 0,226267406 6,21392E-05 0,001491473 0,023437698 0,024774437 6,21392E-05 
 
27 T=6 on op 7,23053E-05 0,94640145 0,014287707 0,001256341 1,55322E-07 0,94640145 
 
28 T=6 on cap  0,176968117 0,000484475 0,00142387 0,019879523 0,046880091 0,000484475 
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Pooled regressions 
Normal Linear Regressions 
Table 39 
     
Coefficients P Values   
All Sectors Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
 
1 Op/T=4 0,000737491 0,620925642 0,04780397 0,021724963 5,50354E-12 0,620925642 
 
2 Cap/T=4 0,005243173 0,186798667 0,04703323 0,349260879 3,48206E-13 0,186798667 
 
3 Op/T=6 0,000321191 0,744173776 0,06058745 0,015034095 2,37291E-16 0,744173776 
 
4 Cap/T=6 0,007736465 0,10859048 0,0587463 0,444876001 1,32622E-17 0,10859048 
Residual Plots 
     











X Variable (Operating Leas intensity) 











X Variable (Capital Leas intensity) 











X Variable (Operating Lease Intensity) 











X Variable (Capital Lease Intensity) 
Y = Lambda (T=6) 
Figure 8 Figure 9 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
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Testing for Heteroskedasticity with pooled lambda data 
1) Dependent: Lambda probability (T=4) = E 





White’s Test   
Table 41 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6356
         chi2(1)      =     0.22
         Variables: fitted values of E
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total        18.71      4    0.0009
                                                   
            Kurtosis         6.42      1    0.0113
            Skewness        12.14      1    0.0005
  Heteroskedasticity         0.14      2    0.9309
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.9309
         chi2(2)      =      0.14
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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2) Dependent: Lambda Probability (T=4) = E 







         Prob > chi2  =   0.0903
         chi2(1)      =     2.87
         Variables: fitted values of E
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total        20.60      4    0.0004
                                                   
            Kurtosis         6.81      1    0.0091
            Skewness        12.26      1    0.0005
  Heteroskedasticity         1.54      2    0.4628
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.4628
         chi2(2)      =      1.54
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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3) Dependent: Lambda Probability (T=6) = G  






White’s Test  
Table 45 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3248
         chi2(1)      =     0.97
         Variables: fitted values of G
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total        21.24      4    0.0003
                                                   
            Kurtosis         5.79      1    0.0161
            Skewness        15.10      1    0.0001
  Heteroskedasticity         0.35      2    0.8403
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.8403
         chi2(2)      =      0.35
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white
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4) Dependent: Lambda Probability (T=6) = G 







         Prob > chi2  =   0.0008
         chi2(1)      =    11.20
         Variables: fitted values of G
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
                                                   
               Total        25.13      4    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis         5.68      1    0.0171
            Skewness        14.44      1    0.0001
  Heteroskedasticity         5.01      2    0.0819
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0819
         chi2(2)      =      5.01
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. imtest, white




     
Coefficients P Values   
All Sectors Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
 
1 T=4/Op 0,0007375 0,186798667 0,066327 0,033946703 1,18273E-14 0,620925642 
 
2 T=4/Cap 0,0052432 0,186798667 0,005697 0,015012196 3,49488E-05 0,186798667 
 
3 T=6/Op 0,0003212 0,744173776 0,066684 0,021364176 5,79211E-14 0,744173776 
 
4 T=6/Cap 0,0077365 0,10859048 0,005365 0,01739016 0,000157898 0,10859048 
 
Pooled Firm Size 
Table 49 
     
Coefficients   P Values   
All Sectors Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
 
1 Size/T=4 0,004076503 0,342591641 0,050109511 -0,013727152 1,86094E-06 0,342591641 
 
2 Size/T=6 0,005294575 0,279286295 0,066928673 -0,016748207 4,31149E-09 0,279286295 
 
Pooled Dummy’s   
Table 50 
     
Coefficients P Values   
All Sectors Resgression Variables R squared Significance of F Intercept Slope (X variable 1) Intercept Slope (X variable 1) 
 
1 Op/T=4 0,0003367 0,738289572 0,054164 -0,005702609 0,00067399 0,738289572 
 
2 Cap/T=4 0,0001873 0,80323736 0,047195 0,003153074 6,34086E-06 0,80323736 
 
3 Op/T=6 0,0003839 0,721258293 0,067077 -0,006385272 6,28479E-05 0,721258293 
 
4 Cap/T=6 0,000668 0,637894216 0,057478 0,006244717 1,81429E-07 0,637894216 
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    R Square 0,025955471 
 
      Adjusted R Square 0,003512049 
       Standard Error 0,107550921 
       Observations 223 
       ANOVA 
     df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 5 0,066886445 0,013377289 1,156484559 0,331726241 
   Residual 217 2,510082534 0,011567201 
     Total 222 2,576968979       
     Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,042883648 0,011615049 3,692076435 0,000281427 0,019990895 0,065776402 0,019990895 0,065776402 
Asset Size -0,009553037 0,016408638 -0,582195587 0,561039333 -0,041893745 0,022787672 -0,041893745 0,022787672 
Op/Assets 0,030367995 0,06407464 0,473947177 0,636014087 -0,095920318 0,156656308 -0,095920318 0,156656308 
Cap/Assets 0,860455835 0,575350733 1,495532699 0,136228346 -0,273535289 1,99444696 -0,273535289 1,99444696 
Op/Assets x Assets -1,62476E-12 4,32794E-12 -0,375411438 0,707721193 -1,01549E-11 6,90542E-12 -1,01549E-11 6,90542E-12 
Cap/Assets x Assets -6,70115E-13 2,49165E-11 -0,026894476 0,978568616 -4,97794E-11 4,84391E-11 -4,97794E-11 4,84E-11 
Regression Statistics 
       R Square 0,040296976 
 
      Adjusted R Square 0,018184003 
       Standard Error 0,114290305 
       Observations 223 
       ANOVA 
     df SS MS F Significance F 
   Regression 5 0,119018402 0,02380368 1,822322873 0,10959049 
   Residual 217 2,83451342 0,013062274 
     Total 222 2,953531822       
     Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,059865161 0,012342874 4,85017998 2,35225E-06 0,035537896 0,084192426 0,035537896 0,084192426 
Asset Size -0,016955707 0,017436841 -0,972407034 0,331930764 -0,051322957 0,017411544 -0,051322957 0,017411544 
Op/Assets 0,010567258 0,068089702 0,155196119 0,87681097 -0,123634567 0,144769082 -0,123634567 0,144769082 
Cap/Assets 1,114060351 0,611403512 1,822136003 0,069810848 -0,090989222 2,319109925 -0,090989222 2,319109925 
Op/Assets x Assets -8,01883E-13 4,59914E-12 -0,174355124 0,861748935 -9,86658E-12 8,26281E-12 -9,86658E-12 8,26281E-12 
Cap/Assets x Assets 6,35757E-12 2,64778E-11 0,24010949 0,810472046 -4,5829E-11 5,85441E-11 -4,5829E-11 5,85441E-11 
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PRIVATE COMPANY REGRESSION RESULTS 
1) Independent Variable: Capital Leas Value / Assets 
Dependent Variable: Altman Z scores 
 
Table 52 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,011744677        
R Square 0,000137937        
Adjusted R Square -0,014785377        
Standard Error 5,127590983        
Observations 69        
         
ANOVA 
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 0,243020899 0,243020899 0,009243083 0,923695617    
Residual 67 1761,576682 26,29218929      
Total 68 1761,819703          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,386768867 0,661969149 2,094914648 0,039962395 0,065472931 2,708064804 0,065472931 2,708064804 
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2) Independent Variable: Capital Leases as Dummy’s 
Dependent Variable: Altman Z scores 
 
Table 53 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,011744677        
R Square 0,000137937        
Adjusted R Square -0,014785377        
Standard Error 5,127590983        
Observations 69        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 0,243020899 0,243020899 0,009243083 0,923695617    
Residual 67 1761,576682 26,29218929      
Total 68 1761,819703          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,386768867 0,661969149 2,094914648 0,039962395 0,065472931 2,708064804 0,065472931 2,708064804 
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3) Independent Variable: Altman Z scores 
Dependent Variable: Capital Leases / Assets 
 
Table 54 
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,004549547        
R Square 2,06984E-05        
Adjusted R Square -0,014904366        
Standard Error 0,055988209        
Observations 69        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 1 4,34724E-06 4,34724E-06 0,00138682 0,970404355    
Residual 67 0,210023528 0,00313468      
Total 68 0,210027875          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,010587544 0,006997584 1,513028433 0,134975503 -0,003379693 0,024554781 -0,003379693 0,024554781 
X Variable 1 4,96736E-05 0,001333877 0,037240033 0,970404355 -0,002612756 0,002712104 -0,002612756 0,002712104 
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